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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
B;\NK OF COMMERCE,
ft

U tali hanking corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
F.

Case No.

11665

SEELY, et al,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

This is an action wherein plaintiff bank claims it
loaned money to the Defendants F. Leland Seely and
T. Seely, his wife, and that the plaintiff is entitled to be repaid. The Defendant F. Leland Seely claims
that pursuant to a request by officers and directors of
the vlaintiff bank, he did accomodate the plaintiff bank,
itt-> officers and directors, by signing a promissory note
fnr which he received no consideration.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The
!lrf<>nclants made motion in open court for leave to amend
thPir answer on file. Plaintiff's motion for summary
.ittflgmcmt was based npon the pleadings, exhibits, affi-
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davits, and counter-affidavits on file. The Court d<•niPd
defendants' motion for
to amPncl their answer and
granted plaintiffs rnotion for summary jndgrnent
111
the Defendant F. Ll•land fScely and denied plaintiff',
motion for snmmary judgment as to the Dd<,nclant GracP
T. Seely.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
That the Supreme 1Court reverse the decision of th1·
lower court by setting aside the summary judgment and
remand to allow the defendant to amend his answer, and
for trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the first day of May, 19G5, defendant
was contacted by James Jamieson, an officer and director of the plaintiff bank. Jamieson explained that as an
officer and director of the Bank of Commerce, he conld
not obtain a loan from the plaintiff hank as others could.
Jamieson stated that he wonkl make arrangc•ments for n
loan in the name of the dcfc•nclant, bnt that it would attnally be tJw loan of James Jamieson. He told the drfendant that this rJl'ocedurn was accPptahle with tl1l'
plaintiff hank and assured tlw clt>fendant this was tlll'
·way that din_•dor loans were handled. The ddcndant
agreed to accornmodak James JamiPson and tlw plain
tiff hank, and

\rn:-;

no ii fied

1\l r. Jmuil·son in early :Ma:.

3
11C1, 11iat tlH' n0cessary annI'gPrnents ltad been made
1

,,illt tlw plaintiff hank and th0 dc•fcndant could go to the
!1ank at his conveniPnce. On May 10, 19G5, the defendant
,,,,,nl to the plaintiff hank in 1\fagna, Utah, with his son
\:ll'll ::\I. Seely. At the bank, defendant was introduced
tn a man \Yho was identified as C. R. Canfield. Mr. Canfir•l<l n•quested that defendant sign a promissory note
for $:2:l,000 and endorse a clwck of the same amount which
]11) licul on his dc•sk. Upon signing the note and endorsing
th d1<·ek, J\ir. Canfield retained both check and promisnote. No instrnctions wne given by the defendant
io ?If r. Canfield or to any other party concerning the
1li,;1im1ition of the funds. No payments were made on the
prnmissory note by the defendant. On November 29,
1'.Jfi:l, tlw ddenclant, to again accomodate James Jamieson
i!l1d

the plaintiff bank, signed a second promissory note

snrn<• amount, which was marked "renewal". No paylll('nh w<>rn made on this note by the defendant, and on

,\foy 20, 1966, the defendant once again accomodated
.l l1Jrws J arnieson and the plaintiff bank by signing a third

prumissory note which was marked "renewal" and which
1.•i l1•d1•cl a rrdnction in principal of $5,000. The fore;'.oi11,1>.;

transactions and additional renewals occurred over

a iwriod of about fonr years . .Tames Jamieson, as an ofi'ic1·r nnu dirrdor, tC'rminated his association with the
jil<i inti f'f

hank ancl no\\· tlt0 plaintiff bank, although an

a1·rommodatcd pnriy, looks to the defendant for the
kdance of the irnlehteclnPss.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN THE
SEELY CASE BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
HIS ANSWER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN THE
SEELY CASE BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED.

Swnnwry Jiidgment, Ride 56, is a carefnlly limited
procedural device to be employed only when there are no
affidavits in good faith, evidence, or inferences which,
when viewed i11 the light most favorable to the losing
party raise any issue of material fact upon ·which relid
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lw granted. Brandt vs. Springville Banking Co., 10
['t.
353 P.2d 4GO (1960); Bullock vs. Desert Dodge
Tr11cl.: Cr11tcr, Inc., 11 Ut. 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960);
Tm1wT 'cs. Utah Poitltry & Farmers Co-op, 11 Ut. 2d 353,
:3:J9 P. 2J 18 (19GO). For the very reason that summary
jnclg1m·nt prevents litigants from fully presenting their
rase_ to the court, courts should be reluctant to invoke
this remedy.
r:m

Ddendants in the Seely case pleaded affirmative
cll•h·nses and submitted affidavits to the court in factual

snpvort of their defense. Reduced to its essentials, the
flefonse is that there "\Yas no consideration for the conlrart

<'Xl'cuted between the parties, and that the plaintiff

holder of the promissory note based thereon is not a
holder in due course entitled to be free of that defense.
(f;ve. 4-t-1-59, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). Indeed, as to

rern·wals, note the parallel statutory provisions in the
Fniforrn Commercial Code, Section 70A-3-306:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due
course any person takes the instrument subject to
(a) All valid claims to it on the part of any
person; and
(b) all def ens es of any party which would be
available in an action on a simple contract; and
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( c) the defenses of want or failure of con
sideration, non1wrformance of any c·o11
dition precedent, nondelivery, or cleliYen
for a special Jlnrpose (
70A-:j_
408);
The plaintiff bank is no transferee holder at all, but an
original party to the agreement. Further, Section 70A3-408 of the Utah Code, adopted in 19G6, merely codified
the existing law on this point when it stat0s: "vVant or
failure of consideration is a defense as agaiust any person not having the rights of a holder in due course... ''

In no sense is the plaintiff bank a "holder in due
course" entitled to be free of this defense. Section 70A3-302 of our Utah Code clearly requires, among other
things, that the instrument be taken for value, in goud
faith, and "·without notice ... of any defense against or
claim to it on the part of any person". The bank would
he charged with the knowledge of its agent-executive
officer, and by its own course of dealing which defendants were prepared to show. Section 70A-3-304 is explicit:
t·ven a purchaser for value has "notice of a claim against
the instrument -wh0n he has knowledge that a fiduciarY
has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as
cnrity for his O\Yn ckht or in any transaction for his mrn
benefit or othenvise in bn-'aeh of dnty".
As reflected hy tlw pkaclings of plaintiff, the affidavit of C. R Canfo,ld, and by tli<' pleadings and conntPlaffidavits of ])p['<>rnlant F. Lvlancl f-Jeely, the facts are in
direct omim;itiou.

1
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The hank's representations as to the facts are:
1. Defendant F. Leland Seely applied for a loan.
2. Defendant F. Leland seely signed the original
pl'Omissory note of May 10, 1965, and a series of renewal
notes.
3. Defendant F. Leland Seely received the money
and gave instructions for its disbursement.
rrhe contentions of the Defendant F. Leland Seely
an':

1. James Jamieson, an officer and director of the
plaintff hank applied and arranged for the loan and asthe defendant this was the ·way that officer and
di n'etor loans were handled by the plaintiff bank.
2. Defendant F. Leland Seely states that he signed
the> original promissory note dated May 10, 1965, and the
::(•fi('S of renewal notes as a third party to accomodate
the plaintiff bank and director James Jamieson, and that,
furthPr, the bank through its officers knew of the arrnug<'ments and, in fact, received and accepted payments
on the note from Jamieson.
3. Defendant F. Leland Seely states that he received
no money and gave no instruction as to disbursement and

8

that said moni('S WPl'C' rc>tf'inncl
J·i'.T
l\I
' 1 f""H' ]11.'
-« _,
'
• · r. (''· R
· . '-an
Vice PresidPnt of thl' plaintiff liank.
Conmwl for
d<'l'Pndant-appellant, argm•d at th
hearing that the foregoing facts are disputed and tl1a1
there does exist between the plaintiff bank and defendant
a bona fide dis1mt<c> of material fact. (Pages 9-11, Tran
script of Procc'0dings). This Court since its decision in
Dupler vs. Yates, 10 Ut. 2d 251, 351 P.2d G24 (1960), lrns
uniformly held that if
is an uncontroverted affi.
davit and there is no dis1rnte of a material fact, then tl11·
court may grant a summary judgnwnt, but if there is <I
counter-affidavit or if there are mat0rial facts in dispnl1"
then to grant a

judgment would he reversibl1· 1

error. See also Larsen vs. Christensen, 21 Ut. 2d 219, 220,
443 P.2d 402 (19GS); Fox vs. AUstate Insurance Com-

pany,

Ut. 2d

P.2d

(1969).

D<·fendant-aJlp0llant and l\fr. Olen l\I. Seely fil1•d
eounter-affidm'its and sd ont facts that were not only
a mere denial of t11e plaintiff's contentions that the <lef endant aprlJ:ecl for tlw loan, received the money alld
gave instructions for its clishnrnc'ments, hut also ha>
raised mntcrinl

of fact m; to defendant's contenti011

that the plaintiff ancl its agr'nt JnnH•s Jamieson were t]JI'
parties accomo<1at<>tl and tliat thP iiiaintiff has on pn'Yions occasion m;<·d this sc11enw and proccdnrc for making· hank orfiec•r ;ind di rPdor loans.
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also appears the lmver court was convinced that
rnaterial issues of fact were raised as on Page 1 of the
Transcript of ProcePdings, the Court states:
From reading the affidavit of the Seelvs and
this bank officer, the two parties haven't diametrically met the issues on the question of consideration, as I recall it. That's why I spoke out at the
beginning, because the Defendant Leland Seely
indicates in his affidavit that he went to the bank
to accommodate Jamieson and the bank. He
doesn't say he went in there to accommodate his
son-in-law, which the bank officer said he went in
there for, so right off the bat the·re is an issue of
fact apparently, unless you can explain it away.
c\ml on Page 2 of the Transcript, the Court states:
Well, I'll put it to you this way. Either you
produce them or I will grant the motion summarily. All right, get them down here. There are
some omissions that need to be amplified, and I'm
shooting from the hip. I may have to take all of
this back.
Counsel for the defendant-appellant could not reach
ancl produce the defendants for questioning at that time.
TJ1r> ddendants Wtc're not subpoenaed and had no notice
tli1·y would he requested to appear. It appears the court
l1a;; shifted the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the
d1·fonuant in the matter of the summary judgment. How1·1 f'l', if you accept the defendant's version of the facts,

10

plaintiff "-onlcl

lw (·11titl('d to jrn1p;m1·nt, 1wcausr ""'u;

accommodation party is not liahl<' to an acc01mnodat1·d

party, rcgardl<·ss of tlH·ir appatT11t n•la',:on upon th1·
Jla1wr." (11 A_m .Tnr :2d Pap:<·;.; ()0!)-(i10)
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEA VE TO AMEND
HIS ANSWER.

Rule lG(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stafr,
that leave to a party to amend his pleading shall he
given when jnstice so rPqnires.
This is a case whc•re tlw motion for summary jnclg
ment was filed 30 days after the filing of the complain!
.l'fo adequate• time
g1v<'n for int<'rrogatori<·s or clPpo:itions. Parti«s to these tnu1sadions w(_•re sea tkn•il
throngl10nt
Nation in Ne"- York, Airzona, California
and Uh1.1i. Prior to th(_• ti11w for hearing the motion for
snnnnary :judg111Pnt, defendant wm; dC'nied time to fnlh
discover the information rn·cPssary to proh•ct his intC'rests a11cl pro1wrt:-- wh<•n snC'h i11fon11a.tion was pnin

ol' plaintiff.

Connsd for tlie <kfrnclnHt at Ow hc'aring mntk
motion to tlit> lower <·m:rt for

l<'HV('

to amend clcfendant'o

answ0r. (Pnrngn1ph 1 of Pa,e>:<' 11, 'l'ran;;cript of Prnccr1l

11
ing;-;.)

'!'his motion was made for the reason as counsel

<llglwd that since the time of filing defendant's answer,
lw had been made a·ware of at least three other occasions

the plaintiff has given loans in the name of a
third party for the purpose of accommodating the plain-

tiff and its officers and directors. In these transactions,
loans were paid by the accomodated officers and din•etors of the plaintiff (Pages 9-10, Transcript of Prou,rclings) .
Tn the third paragraph of defendant's counter-affidayi.t, the defendant makes mention of this scheme used
1

h>· the plaintiff and states that James Jamieson, the
plaintiff's officer and director, assured him that this was
tlie way these types of officer and director loans were
handled. These facts are also stated in the third paragraph of the counter-affidavit of Mr. Glen M. Seely.
Certainly, the foregoing facts raised are material,
and give rise to an affirmative defense which the defendant has the right to assert. If plaintiff's version of the
fads are shown in a trial on the merits then certainly the

plaintiff in this matter before the court is the accom1no<lakd party and under the law would be estopped
from asserting its claim against the defendant. 11 Am.
-l 11r. 2d, pages 599, G09, and 610.
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The Supreme Court should reverse the decision of
the lower court by setting aside the summary
and remand to allow the defendant to amend his answer,
and for trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
TURNER & F AIRBOURN
GERALD L. TURNER
Valley Professional Plaza
2525 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.

Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage
prepaid, to Rendell N. Mabey, Attorney for Bani
of Commerce, the Plaintiff and Respondent, at
1700 University Club Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, on the
of August, 1969.

7

.

Gerald L. Turner
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